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ABSTRACT 
 
We contend that economics is in need of a new paradigm.  When taught in the 
traditional neoclassical construct, economics is not appealing to many students, 
particularly those taking economics to satisfy general education requirements.  This, in 
turn, may explain why economic literacy in the U.S. is trending downward.  Our 
approach uses game theory to teach economics by juxtaposing neoclassical and 
institutional economic paradigms so that students not only better understand the 
neoclassical model, but also are exposed to alternative approaches in economics.  To 
better understand neoclassical models, we incorporate three institutional criticisms of 
neoclassical economics: (1) the assumption that all individuals are perfectly rational, 
(2) the propensity to create theories using static models that take as given (and usually 
ignore) important, exogenous factors influencing decision-making processes, and (3) 
an emphasis on modeling techniques and less of an emphasis on what is actually being 
modeled and how it is being modeled.  We also integrate institutional and neoclassical 
economics by illustrating how history, culture, and emotion interact with the traditional 
neoclassical principles to inform economic decision-making via simple (evolutionary) 
games that can be used in the classroom.     
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Neoclassical economics (NCE) has become the dominant means of teaching and 
practicing economics.  NCE efficiently illustrates how formal models can be used to 
describe economic and social behavior.  However, to make these models tractable, 
neoclassical economists generally posit a series of assumptions.  These assumptions 
often limit the ability of such models to accurately and precisely explain decision-
making in the world as it actually exists.  This, in turn, reduces the depth and breadth 
of skills and information transferred to economics students in the classroom.  While 
assumptions allow the economist the means to model the world in its simplest form, the 
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end result is often unrealistic because the “true” world is much more complex than the 
model allows it to be.  
Institutional economists further this argument by identifying several assumptions 
that limit the viability of NCE models.  They argue that NCE models can be criticized 
on at least three grounds.  The first is the assumption that all individuals are perfectly 
rational.  That is, emotions and values are independent of the decision-making process 
of the rational economic agent.  Realistically, individuals do not always make decisions 
that maximize their net benefits, as if each rational agent is the same as the next with 
the exception of current “preferences”.  While this assumption may be appropriate in 
certain instances (or possibly on aggregate or on average), other social science 
researchers (including marketers, sociologists, psychologists, ethicists and non-
neoclassical economists) argue that this definition of rationality is too strict.  Instead, 
individuals “make mistakes” and act on impulse, emotion, and incorporate their values 
in their decision-making, especially under time and information constraint.   
 
A second criticism of NCE is the propensity of neoclassical economists to create 
theories and testable hypotheses using static models.  Static models generally take as 
given (and usually ignore) important, exogenous factors influencing decision-making 
processes.  As such, little thought is given to how past experiences influence current 
decision-making, or the role that the evolution of economic and/or political institutions 
plays in current decision-making.  To some extent these assumptions are self-
supporting; if one holds constant an individual’s history and experience, the assumption 
of perfect rationality seems plausible.  However, ignoring these factors also leads to 
limited (and possibly inaccurate) theories and testable hypotheses, especially if we 
believe that history and past experience can in fact shape current decision-making.  
Often NCE only analyzes the “where you are at?” and not the “how did you get there?” 
hypotheses. 
 
A third, and perhaps more important criticism, is that neoclassical economists, 
particularly when teaching at the principles level, often present an economic model as 
an end in and of itself.  That is, neoclassical economists usually assume that no 
alternatives which explain the same behavioral processes exist.  Moreover, the model 
itself often becomes the focus of learning, not the issue the model attempts to address 
(Hansen, 1991).  The values, underlying assumptions and the way in which these values 
and assumptions shape the outcomes of the model are not taught, discussed, or 
explained to the student.  This becomes especially problematic when i) other behavioral 
models do exist and they are ignored or ii) when the neoclassical model does not provide 
an accurate or precise explanation for the phenomenon in which it is attempting to 
explain.  As a result, economics loses its appeal to students taking an economics course 
for the first time.          
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Recently, economists have begun searching for approaches to address these 
issues.  One promising approach is the use of game theory.  Game theory was developed 
by mathematicians and has been applied in a variety of fields (including anthropology 
and evolutionary biology) where static models are not the norm.  Game theory can be 
used to address how history, experience, and culture influence and shape decision-
making.  Evolutionary games have also been adapted to include various types (or levels 
of) rationality.  This allows the decision-maker to exhibit “bounded-rationality” – that 
is, to make mistakes or act on impulse, but subsequently learn from those mistakes and 
make better (self-interested) decisions over time.     
  
Now, on the institutional side, some consideration must be given to the fact that 
many institutional economists are skeptical about (or adamantly against) the use of 
formal economic modeling.  Depending on one’s view about the use of formal 
modeling, game theory can serve one of two distinct purposes.  For those who do not 
have an aversion to formal modeling, game theory can be a useful tool for advancing 
institutionalist thought.  At a technical level, neoclassical economists such as Douglass 
North and Oliver Williamson have used game theory to address institutional issues for 
several decades (Dugger, 1995; Fiori, 2002).  More recently, several studies have used 
game theory as a tool to analyze decisions from a purely institutional perspective.  For 
example, Tomass (1997) uses game theory to address irrational behavior and sectarian 
cleansing.  Villena and Villena (2004) demonstrate that under many conditions, 
Veblen’s theory of evolutionary economics is consistent with that of evolutionary game 
theory.  These papers imply that as long as institutional economists are willing to adopt 
(or tolerate) a formal approach to economics, game theory can be a useful technical 
tool.  
 
Alternatively, if one is unwilling to cede the use of formal economic models in 
institutional thought, one can apply these tools as another means to demonstrate the 
shortcomings of NCE.  That is, one can use the same tools advanced by NCE to show 
that NCE does not always fulfill its goal of adequately describing decision-making 
processes.  In this case, our paper argues that game theory can be used as a critical 
device, which can be introduced into economic pedagogy.      
                 
In either case, our intent is to provide a case study that demonstrates the 
pedagogical uses of game theory in general and evolutionary economic games in 
particular.  Although game theory can be used to teach economics at every level, we 
focus our attention on incorporating these tools into principles of economics courses 
because this is often the only economics course students take.   
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds in four steps.  We first provide a review of 
literature that demonstrates the need for a new paradigm at the principles level. Next, 
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we briefly discuss the premise of both institutional economics and game theory, with 
an emphasis on the similarities (and differences) between the two modes of thought.  
Third, we provide a series of examples to illustrate how institutionalist thought can be 
integrated into simple, evolutionary games for classroom use.  We conclude the paper 
by discussing our findings and provide several recommendations for future work.  
 
II. WHY A NEW PARADIGM IS IMPORTANT 
   
Economic literacy in the US is low and principles courses are having little to no 
impact on economic literacy (Walstad and Rebeck, 2002; Walstad and Algood, 1997). 
Given that 40 percent of all college students take at least on economics course one 
would expect economic literacy to be higher (Siegfried, 2000).  One possible 
explanation for low economic literacy given relatively high levels of economic 
exposure is that educators are not able to convey economic concepts to students in a 
way that allows students to retain and learn the information.  As a result, economic 
educators have begun to explore different approaches that might improve economic 
literacy.  Two common approaches are to institute an “active learning” approach 
(Becker, 2001; Siegfried and Sanderson, 2003) and to change the institutional 
framework, for example, by altering student to teacher ratios (Siegfried and Sanderson, 
2003).   
 
Hansen, Salemi and Siegfried (2002) provides a different recommendation, 
discussing content they believe should be cut from the introductory curriculum.  On the 
micro side, they advocate limiting the use of graphs and elasticities, the discussion of 
cost curves and comparisons of different types of imperfectly competitive markets.  On 
the macro side, they suggest eliminating aggregate demand/supply analysis, removing 
formulas for Keynesian multipliers and reducing the amount of time spent covering 
national income accounting.  They also follow Becker (2001) and Siegfried and 
Sanderson (2003) by advocating, whenever possible, the use of active learning as well 
as adding “really cool stuff” to the course content. 
 
 A related approach posited by Knoedler and Underwood (2003, 2004) and 
Underwood (2004), argues that, at its essence, economics is a study based on critical 
thinking.  The problem with traditional principles of economics courses is that, by 
paying too much attention to the tools, students are led to believe that the tools are an 
end in and of itself.  Thus, students learn (or more likely memorize) how the tools 
works, not what issue the tools are attempting to address.  As a result, students are not 
learning critical thinking skills.  Instead, they are learning analytical thinking skills, 
which are more easily forgotten, less easily applied to real-world problems, and less 
interesting to students.   Moreover, adding case studies and supporting information to a 
tools-oriented economics course is less interesting and less conducive to learning 
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because it forces the instructor to find a case that “fits” the tool being discussed.  And 
because most economic models make a number of questionable assumptions to 
maintain tractability (for example, rationality and the use of static models) it is often 
difficult for an instructor to find a convincing, interesting case that closely fits the tool.   
The authors are also careful to note that analytical skills are neither more nor less 
important than critical thinking skills.  Instead, they argue that the way in which 
introductory economics courses are currently taught does not strike a proper balance 
between analytical and critical thinking.  As a result, adding critical thinking content to 
(and at the same time reducing analytical content in) introductory courses should 
enhance learning outcomes.     
 
 In making these arguments, Knoedler and Underwood (2003, 2004) and 
Underwood (2004) also provide an interesting criticism of the aforementioned studies.  
The problem with teaching and learning introductory economics is not what material is 
cut from the course or what “neat stuff” is added.  Instead, the problem is the tools, 
themselves, that are used to convey economic concepts.  More specifically, because 
more Ph.D. programs train economists to think within a formal structure (usually a 
neoclassical paradigm), that, in turn, is how they relate those economic issues to their 
students.  But as long as these tools and paradigms are used in principles of economics 
courses, the problem will persist.  Thus, the aforementioned studies at best marginally 
reduce the problem, and at worst are ineffective. 
 
 The solution, according to Knoedler and Underwood (2003, 2004) is to take a 
historical (or institutional) approach to teaching principles of economics.  That is, the 
“neat stuff” posited by Becker should not simply be “added on” to current course 
material; it should instead be the focal point of the lecture or class discussion – at least 
at the principles level.  The role of the instructor, then (whether through a chalk and talk 
method, one of active learning, or some combination of the two) is to encourage 
students to think critically about the decision-making processes, history and cultural 
influences surrounding an event to subsequently deduce the underlying economic 
principle(s).  In doing so, students learn economic concepts in a manner that is more 
effective and interesting because they are able to take a real-world problem and figure 
out the economics on the basis of their own experiences, logic and intuition. 
 
 Despite its novelty, Reardon (2004) notes that such an approach is not without 
its drawbacks.  Perhaps most importantly, economics instructors, the majority of whom 
are trained as neoclassical economists, are loathed to give up their tool-oriented 
approach in favor of an alternative approach, however novel, unless there is a definable 
method of presenting these economic concepts to students.  Put another way, there is a 
significant opportunity cost to instructors in changing the paradigm by which 
economics is taught.  As a result, even if this new paradigm is successful in increasing 
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interest and retention of economic concepts, academic economists will be unwilling to 
adopt it.  Consequently, this new paradigm is not viable unless it can be placed within 
a structure familiar to most (neoclassical) economists. 
 
 In this paper, we argue that there is at least one common thread that links 
traditional economics courses to the paradigm posited by Knoedler and Underwood – 
the use of game theory in general, and evolutionary game theory in particular.  If this 
link exists, then it may be possible to make changes in how instructors teach 
introductory economics courses to ensure that students who successfully complete these 
courses gain some added value.  In the next section, we establish how game theory 
represents that link.  
 
III. GAME THEORY AS A MEANS OF COMBINING CRITICAL THINKING 
WITH ECONOMIC CONTENT 
 
 Our analysis operates under a series of assumptions regarding the value and 
content of the economics discipline as a whole.  First, we assume that economics is a 
social science that can be learned and applied to explain and predict individual decision-
making.  That is, we assume that the discipline of economics has validity, and thus 
makes a unique contribution to the depth and breadth of human knowledge.  Secondly, 
we assume that economics does take its fundamental genesis from the process of critical 
thought.  Lastly, we assume that economics is relevant enough to students’ lives that, if 
an economics course is taken seriously by its students and conducted appropriately by 
its instructor, a significant portion (if not a majority) of students will find the course 
interesting and useful.  
  
Taken in tandem, these assumptions guarantee that there is at least one approach 
to teaching economics (and principles of economics courses in particular) that adds 
some value to the typical student’s base of knowledge.  If these assumptions hold, the 
crucial issues are i) whether (evolutionary) game theory can be categorized as one of 
these “optimal” approaches and ii) whether game theory is sufficiently general enough 
that it can be accepted by mainstream (neoclassical) economists as a legitimate and 
viable alternative to the traditional approach.  Our intent is not to show that game theory 
is the only such approach.  Indeed, there are likely a number of equally viable 
approaches, of which game theory is only one possibility.  One such alternative is to 
teach economics using a “history of thought” approach.  That is, to teach economic tools 
and concepts within a historical perspective, and then show how those ideas (and their 
accompanying formalistic models) evolve over time.  As the models and ideas change, 
one can then highlight the shortcoming of those models, and how historical and 
institutional changes were responsible for those shortcomings.   
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 Given our assumptions, we can address these issues by answering the following 
series of questions: 
 
1) Is game theory “mainstream”? 
2) Can game theory be used to teach a broad group of students? 
3) Does game theory reduce the emphasis on learning a set of economic models 
and place more emphasis on using historical and cultural context, critical 
thinking and logical deduction to analyze decision-making?  
4) Can game theory be used to relax potentially unrealistic assumptions (including 
rationality and the use of static models) inherent in traditional neoclassic 
analysis? 
5) Can game theory be taught in a way that makes economic concepts “really 
cool” to a majority of students? 
 
The remainder of this section attempts to address each of these questions.  While it is 
nearly impossible to answer each of these questions in absolute terms, our goal is to 
provide a compelling argument stating that the answers to these questions are “yes”. 
 
1. IS GAME THEORY “MAINSTREAM”? 
 
 Game theory has become an integral part of graduate and undergraduate 
economic education.  As evidence, game theory has made its way into many principles’ 
texts (McEachern, 2006; Frank and Bernanke, 2001; Colander, 2004; McConnell and 
Brue, 2005) and has become a part of micro economic fields such as public choice and 
industrial organization (Triole, 1988; Mueller, 1997).  At the principles level game 
theory has begun to show in more than just the oligopoly chapters.  For instance, Frank 
and Bernanke (2001) use game theory in their information economics chapter.  Game 
theory is also being used to teach econometrics and macro theory (Alesina, Boubini and 
Cohen, 1997).  Therefore, we do believe that game theory is a part of “mainstream” 
economics and generally accepted by neoclassical economists and some institutional 
economists as a viable pedagogical tool. 
  
2. CAN GAME THEORY BE USED TO TEACH A BROAD GROUP OF 
STUDENTS? 
 
 A thorough understanding of game theory is not restricted to students with high 
levels of mathematical training.  Game theory can be used to teach students at all levels 
of mathematics.  Secondly, because game theory was developed by mathematicians it 
has found its way into many different disciplines including anthropology, evolutionary 
biology, ethics and psychology (just to name a few).  The Dixit and Skeath (2004) text 
is a good example of how game theory can be used to blend economics with other 
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disciplines.  As a result, economics becomes more interesting to non-majors, who can 
use economic reasoning to address issues that do interest them.  This could be very 
important in reaching students who are taking economics only to satisfy general 
education requirements.  For the economics major, game theory teaches students the 
concepts that would have been learned in the traditional construct, in addition to 
teaching students the role that assumptions play in shaping outcomes.  That is, game 
theory teaches students to think both critically and analytically. 
 
3. DOES GAME THEORY EMPHASIZE HISTORY, CULTURAL CONTEXT, 
CRITICAL THINKING AND LOGICAL DEDUCTION? 
 
 Game theory is well grounded in the case study approach to teaching.  Therefore, 
in order to model the game appropriately the modeler must understand the players in 
the game, their tastes and preferences, the historical and cultural context and the general 
characteristics of the players involved in the game.  It is only when these fundamental 
characteristics of the game are understood that the game can be modeled appropriately 
and the outcomes understood (Foss, 2000).  The case makes the game come alive to 
students, and as a result is more interesting to students.  This is a far cry from the “guns” 
and “butter” examples so many of us had to endure in our principle’s courses. 
 
4. CAN GAME THEORY BE USED TO RELAX POTENTIALLY 
UNREALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS INHERENT IN TRADITIONAL 
NEOCLASSICAL ANALYSIS? 
 
 There is a substantial literature on learning in economic games, as well as an 
emphasis on dynamic, repeated decision making in game theory, both of which are the 
common criticisms of the neoclassical paradigm (McCain, 2004; Dixit and Skeath, 
2004; Gardener, 2003).  In the next section, we provide some examples of how to 
incorporate games into principles-level teaching.  Moreover, we have specifically 
chosen as our examples some games that highlight the failure of the neoclassical 
paradigm as well as show the advantage of game theory in teaching these same 
concepts. 
 
5. CAN GAME THEORY BE A WAY TO MAKE ECONOMICS “REALLY 
COOL” TO A MAJORITY OF STUDENTS? 
 
At its very essence, game theory is exactly what its name suggests – games.  
From the beginning of one’s life to the end of one’s life, we play games.  All that 
changes over the course of most of our lives is the type of games we play.  As children, 
we play board games and games of “chase”, such as “hide and go seek”.  As young 
adults (as college students) the games we play are more social and soul searching; for 
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instance, games related to dating, partying, and pop culture.  But regardless of the 
game(s) being played, they all involve interactive decision-making; that is, making 
“good” choices when those choices influence (or are influenced by) the choices of 
others.  Thus, game theory is not only relevant to students of economics, but “fun”, 
“interesting” and “really cool” as well, so long as the instructor is careful to choose case 
studies and hypothetical examples that directly relate and are interesting to students’ 
lives.   
 
IV. PEDAGOGICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 In this section we illustrate how game theory can be incorporated into economic 
pedagogy at the introductory level.  Special emphasis is given to evolutionary and 
bounded rationality games, as they also highlight how game theory can be used to relax 
some of the unrealistic assumptions inherent in the traditional neoclassical paradigm in 
addition to incorporating tenants of institutional economics.   
 
We assume that students (and the reader) are familiar with the concept of a Nash 
Equilibrium, and how it can be applied to solve both simultaneous and sequential 
games. We refer the reader to Dixit and Skeath (2004) or Gardener (2003) if this is not 
the case.  If an introductory economics course were to be based solely around game 
theory, the instructor would likely introduce this technique at the beginning of the 
course, prior to discussing any substantial economic content.  As such, this assumption 
seems innocuous.   
 
The difference between our approach and that of traditional NCE principles 
courses is that, by forcing the students to create the game and conduct the sensitivity 
analyses themselves, they are learning critical thinking skills.  By solving the game, 
students are also learning the analytical skills traditionally emphasized in these courses.  
Thus, the use of game theory (especially when applied in the context of case analysis 
and story problems) provides a unique blend of skills necessary for student retention 
and interest.  Additionally, by choosing cases and/or story problems that are of interest 
to students, one can also incorporate the “really cool stuff” advocated by Becker (2001). 
 
1. A STORY PROBLEM THAT PROVIDES AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
TRADITIONAL UTILITY MAXIMIZATION 
 
Pam A. likes K-Rock, and K-Rock likes Pam A.  The problem is that they both 
have their reputation to uphold, thus neither wants to ask the other out.  One way for 
them to minimize their respective egos is to try and be at the same establishment, at the 
same time, so that they can flirt with one another.  K-Rock spoke with T-Lee, Pam A.’s 
former husband, and found out that she hangs out at two different places, depending on 
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her “mood”.  Pam A. either goes to the Reflex too drink herbal tea and listen to mellow 
tunes, or she goes to the Go-Go (a techno-club) for some dancing.  Suppose that K-
Rock really enjoys going to the Reflex and is only interested in going to the Go-Go if 
Pam A. is there.  Alternatively, Pam A. prefers the Go-Go, particularly if K-Rock shows 
up.   
 
This scenario provides information about both players’ value set.  There is also 
information regarding the tradeoffs and alternatives faced by both players.  To this 
point, however, there is no quantitative definition of the payoffs, e.g., the happiness 
received from various choices by each player and no mention of rationality or 
maximization. 
 
Consequently, in order to set up and solve the game, students must make some 
additional assumptions about these issues.  Suppose, for example, that students choose 
to assume that i) decisions are to be made simultaneously, ii) individuals are rational 
and self-interested and iii) the payoffs can be defined qualitatively via an ordered 
ranking from “best” to “worst”.  Given these assumptions, the game may be constructed 
as follows: 
 
FIGURE 1 
THE BASIC GAME IN NORMAL FORM 
 
 
Each cell in the table (or normal form game) contains a pair of “payoffs”, or 
potential outcomes for each player.  Reading from left to right, the first payoff in each 
cell corresponds to the decision-maker listed on the rows of the table.  The second 
payoff corresponds to the individual listed on the columns of the table.  Based on the 
Nash equilibrium concept, this game can be solved to deduce two “optimal” decisions: 
one where both individuals meet at the Reflex and one where both meet at the Go-Go. 
 
      K-Rock 
 
    Reflex    Go-Go 
 
Reflex  (better,best)    (worst,worst) 
 
Pam A. 
 
 Go-Go  (OK,OK)    (best,better)   
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 This set of assumptions produces an equilibrium that is of particular 
interest to institutional economics: multiple equilibria.  That is, when one has limited 
(usually qualitative) information on which to base decisions, and when one specifically 
takes values and culture into account, it is often the case that there is more than one 
“optimal”, or “equally best” decision.  The question then becomes whether and how 
individuals choose among these different “optimal” choices.  If one can reasonably 
assume numerical values for each of the payoffs, then a parsimonious approach is to 
assume that each party simply “guesses”, or randomly chooses one of the optimal 
alternatives a certain proportion of the time.  In this case, one can find a “mixed strategy 
Nash Equilibrium” (MSNE), which simply identifies each of these proportions (or 
empirical probabilities). 
 
 To calculate the MSNE, let us assume, for example, that happiness for 
each party can be measured on a 0 to 100 interval, with the “best” outcome equal to 
100, a “better” outcome equal to 66.67, an “OK” outcome equal to 33.33, and a “worst” 
outcome equal to 0 for each player.  One might choose to label this interval in 
percentage terms, so that 100 implies “complete happiness” and 0 implies “complete 
unhappiness”.  Students may also assume different numerical payoff structures, which, 
in turn, dictate the MSNE.  Instructors may choose to determine the MSNE under 
several different payoff systems to further underscore the fact that values dictate 
assumptions which, in turn, dictate decisions.   
 
Given our numerical values (which are consistent with the initial game’s pure 
strategy Nash equilibria), the new game consequently takes the following form: 
 
FIGURE 2 
ADDING NUMERICAL VALUES 
 
 
 
      K-Rock 
 
    Reflex    Go-Go 
 
Reflex  (66.67,100)    (0,0) 
 
Pam A. 
 
 Go-Go  (33.33,33.33)   (100,66.67)  
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The idea behind the MSNE is that, if each player randomly chooses an alternative 
a proportion of the time, then each player will obtain an expected value (or a weighted 
average of the two outcomes, where the proportions are the weights) for each 
alternative.  If there are two “optimal” choices, then each, at least on average, should 
yield the same net payoff.  Moreover, by definition, each player must choose some 
alternative; thus the sum of the proportions must equal one.  The trick to the MSNE is 
that one individual’s expected value depends on the proportion (or probability) that the 
other individual makes a specific choice.  That is, Pam A.’s average happiness depends 
on what K-Rock chooses, and vice-versa.  In algebraic terms, this can be represented 
for Pam A. as: 
 
1.   =       
2.  =       
3. =          
4.          
 
Using algebra, we find that K-Rock randomly chooses to frequent the Go-Go 25 
percent of the time and the Reflex 75 percent of the time.  By similar logic, we find that 
Pam A. goes to the Reflex 25 percent of the time and the Go-Go 75 percent of the time.  
The average payoff for each player is then 50.    
 
 Yet another drawback to NCE is the over-use of static models.  Our previous 
example can also be considered a static game, since it is assuming that each individual 
makes his or her decision simultaneously.  However, we can easily adapt our current 
game to a dynamic format by allowing individuals to make sequential decisions 
(holding all other assumptions in place).  To do so, we need only construct a decision 
tree with the payoffs from the previous game.  Let us assume that Pam A. makes her 
choice first.  In this case, the decision tree takes the following form: 
 
FIGURE 3 
THE GAME IN DYNAMIC FORM 
 
flex
PamAEV
Re
. ( ) ( )067.66Re GoGo RockKflexRockK pp --- +
GoGo
PamAEV
-
. ( ) ( )10033.33Re GoGo RockKflexRockK pp --- +
flex
PamAEV
Re
.
GoGo
PamAEV
-
.
1Re =+ ---
GoGo
RockK
flex
RockK pp
 
      Reflex  (66.67,100) 
     
         Reflex       Go-Go (0,0) 
      Reflex 
        Go-Go     (33.33, 33.33)   
             Go-Go (100, 66.67) 
Pam 
A. 
K-Rock 
K-Rock 
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Note that whoever makes the first decision also has their payoffs listed first.  The 
second decision-maker’s payoffs are listed next. 
 
 To find the Nash equilibrium, we employ a technique known as backward 
induction.  The idea behind this technique is, in order to incorporate strategy into each 
individual’s decisions’, we must solve the game in reverse.  Since this is a two-stage 
game, we start with K-Rock’s decision set.  If Pam A. goes to the Reflex, K-Rock’s 
best option is also to go to the Reflex.  On the other hand, if Pam A. goes to the Go-
Go, K-Rock will also choose the Go-Go.  Now move back to the first decision of the 
game.  If Pam A. chooses to go to the Reflex, she knows that K-Rock will choose to 
follow her there, giving her a payoff of 66.67.  On the other hand, she also anticipates 
that K-Rock will also follow her to the Go-Go if she chooses this option.  Since she 
likes the Go-Go better than the Reflex (especially since K-Rock follows her there), 
she chooses the Go-Go, as does K-Rock. 
 
 As with the static game, the dynamic game also allows an instructor to stress 
how values and culture shape decision-making.  First, note that, by allowing one 
individual to make decisions prior to the other, we no longer have multiple “best” 
choices.  Instead, the individual choosing first was able to influence the joint decision-
making process such that this individual (in this case, Pam A.) was able to obtain an 
outcome that was the best she could hope for (she goes to the Go-Go which she 
prefers and meets K-Rock there).  A related question that naturally arises is whether 
the outcome would be different if the order of decision-making were reversed.  If so, 
then, again, the individual choosing first is able to skew the decision-making process 
in his or her favor.  In game theory, this is known as a “first mover advantage”.  In an 
institutional economics framework, this is the influence of history, culture and 
psychology on decision-making.  To verify whether such an advantage exists, we 
reverse the order of play and utilize backward induction:   
 
FIGURE 4 
FIRST MOVER ADVANTAGE 
 
 
 
      Reflex  (100,66.67) 
     
         Reflex       Go-Go (33.33,33.33) 
      Reflex 
        Go-Go     (0,0)   
             Go-Go (66.67, 100) 
K-
Rock 
Pam A. 
Pam A. 
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 Using logic similar to the previous game, we do indeed find that there is a first 
mover advantage.  In this case, Pam A. now follows K-Rock.  K-Rock, anticipating 
this, now chooses to go to the venue he prefers most – the Reflex.  So by reversing the 
order of decision-making, K-Rock is made better off at the expense of Pam A, but 
both are better off than they would have been if they had not gone to the same venue.   
 
 As an economics instructor, the concept of a first mover advantage allows the 
instructor a tremendous opportunity to discuss the role values, culture, and history 
play in decision-making.  For example, in this case an assumption about which player 
moves first is roughly equivalent to making an assumption about who holds “power” 
in the relationship, or the role that culture (which helps shape “power”) plays in 
decision-making.  It has been more typical in American society, for instance, for the 
male to pursue the female. 
 
 Now let us discuss an example within an economics context.  In games of 
business and market structure, the firm that moves first is essentially the dominant 
firm in the market.  This naturally leads to a class discussion about how and why that 
firm has developed the dominant position in the first place.  For instance, many 
smaller firms trying to compete with larger firms (i.e., Microsoft, IBM, etc.) often 
have to observe these firms' moves before making their business decisions (moves).  
If these smaller firms move first, they expose themselves to being "smashed" by larger 
firms.  Again, as the moves are reversed, and the larger firm goes first they might 
employ “predatory” behavior.  This, in turn, leads to a discussion of culture, values, 
and history. 
 
 A third criticism of NCE is that it often requires the assumption of both 
rationality and perfect foresight.  As a result, it is impossible in traditional NCE 
(especially at a level commensurate with principles of economics courses) to learn by 
making mistakes (also known as “bounded rationality”), or through repeated 
interaction (which also encompasses learning over time).  Again, we can use some 
simple algebra and game theory techniques to allow our dating example to account for 
these factors.   
 
 Suppose that we have a large number of men and women in Los Angeles 
similar to Pam A. and K-Rock (allowing two players to interact repeatedly over time 
would produce a similar result).  For simplicity, we assume that all of the K-Rocks 
and Pam As have similar “likes and dislikes”, or payoffs, about where they go to hang 
out.  Each K-Rock is “randomly matched” (perhaps through a friend, or through word 
of mouth about where the women are planning to hang out) to a Pam A.  After being 
randomly matched, each “couple” must simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide 
where to go.  Let x be the proportion (or probability) of Pam As who choose to go to 
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the Reflex (the other 1-x go to the Go-Go), and define y as the proportion of K-Rocks 
that go to the Reflex (again, the other 1-y go to the Go-Go). 
 
 To start, let’s consider the choices for the Pam As.  Their expected payoffs (or 
expected values) from going to the Reflex and the Go-Go, respectively, are given by: 
 
5.  =       
6.  =   
    
Similarly, K-Rocks expected payoffs are given by: 
 
7.  =      
8.  = 0x + 66.67(1-x) = 66.67(1-x)  
     
 The central idea behind bounded rationality and repeated interaction is that, as 
the value of y (the proportion of K-Rocks going to the Reflex) increases, the Pam As 
who go to the Reflex will be better off than if they had gone to the Go-Go.  Similarly, 
as x (the proportion of Pam As going to the Reflex) increases, each K-Rock is 
betteroff if he goes to the Reflex rather than the Go-Go (and vice versa if x and y 
decline).  In common sense terms, this implies that the men want to be where most of 
the women are, and the women also want to be where most of the men are.  Moreover, 
if a K-Rock can obtain a greater than average payoff by going to the Reflex, he will; 
otherwise, he will go to the Go-Go.  The Pam As make an analogous decision.  Thus, 
a greater (smaller) value for x will induce more K-Rocks to “switch” from the Go-Go 
to the Reflex (the Reflex to the Go-Go).  An increase (or decrease) in y will have an 
analogous impact on the women. 
 
 The real difficulty with this scenario is that as changes in x induce more K-
Rocks to switch to leave the Go-Go and head to the Reflex, this in turn changes y – 
the proportion of K-Rocks at the Reflex.  This forces some women to switch locations 
as well.  In short, there is feedback between the two groups of individuals, making it 
difficult for people to make a correct choice about where to hang out.     
 
 The equilibrium occurs when men and women stop “switching” locations.  We 
note that one, naive way for the Pam As to stop switching locations (thus halting any 
change in x) when  = .  This occurs when y = 0.75.  Values of y > 0.75 
induce more women to go to the Reflex (thus increasing x), while values of y < 0.75 
have the opposite effect.  Analogously, the K-Rocks may naively cease switching (and 
halting any change in y) when  = , which occurs when x = 0.25.  The 
men switch to the Reflex when x > 0.25 and switch to the Go-Go when x < 0.25.  
flex
PamAEV
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. yyy 67.66)1(067.66 =-+
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Taken in tandem, we reach a naive equilibrium (equivalent to our MSNE) where a 
quarter of the women go to the Reflex and three quarters of the men go to the Reflex.  
Figure 5 provides a phase diagram that depicts these joint decisions graphically: 
 
FIGURE 5 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
 
 These mechanics raise several important questions, the most notable of which 
are how this analysis allows individuals to make mistakes, and how this analysis 
models repeated behavior.  First, individuals make mistakes because of the feedback 
mechanism; as women switch from one location to another, the men are also forced to 
switch, and verse-vica.  Consequently, the evolutionary stable equilibrium must be 
considered as an “average” or “long-run” concept.  As long as individuals are still 
moving towards the equilibrium, they are still in the process of either making mistakes 
or learning from those mistakes.  The analysis of repeated behavior stems from the 
fact that we are looking at a large number of individuals making these choices (or the 
same individual making a large number of choices over time).  Thus, this process is 
consistent with the notion of a repeated experiment.     
 
 A final criticism of NCE that evolutionary game theory addresses is the 
“falsity” or “instability” of static equilibria.  That is, by allowing individuals to evolve 
and/or make mistakes over time, the “optimal” decisions made in a static environment 
may, in fact, not be optimal, or “stable” at all.  Our simple evolutionary game 
illustrates this effectively by examining the algebra and phase diagram in further 
detail.  More specifically, further inspection reveals two additional equilibria; one at x 
= 0 and y = 0 (i.e., both the men and the women go to the Go-Go) and one at x = 1 
and y = 1 (both go to the Reflex).  That is, people may also stop switching when they 
“run out of options”, or in mathematical terms, reach a boundary.  The interesting 
result that occurs from this game is that the existence of these boundary equilibria 
makes the mixed strategy equilibrium unstable, and thus not an optimal choice. 
 
 
                y = 1 
 
     0.75 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   0       0.25    x = 1 
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To illustrate this, we need only consider a simple exercise, which is illustrated 
in Figure 6. If the two individuals don’t make any mistakes and/or start near x = .25 
and y = .75 (i.e., the intersection of the line segments AB and CD), it is conceivable 
that they could end up at the MSNE.  But if any mistakes are made, or if one starts out 
at a point away from the MSNE (for example, at a point in the lower left quadrant 
where x = 0.2 and y = 0.5), then these decision-makers will gravitate towards the 
equilibrium where the men and the women both go to the same location.  In this case, 
the men and the women are both better off by switching to the Go-Go, so that x = 0 
and y = 0.  Alternatively, if mistakes or decisions place the individuals in the upper-
right quadrant, say, at x = .5 and y = .8, then both individuals are better off both going 
to the Reflex; that is moving towards x = 1 and y = 1.  Similar arguments can be made 
if the men and women start in the other two quadrants.  Thus, the completed diagram 
takes the following form:   
 
FIGURE 6 
FALSE EQUILIBRIA 
                
 
 
To demonstrate this result algebraically, simply have students plug these values 
for x and y into the expected value functions for Pam A. and K-Rock.  One will find 
that, for each player, the expected value of going to the Go-Go outweighs the 
expected value (or payoff) for going to the Reflex.  As such, both the men and women 
will switch to the Go-Go.  Over time or repeated decision-making, this reduces both x 
and y to zero. 
 
 This finding lends credence to two institutional criticisms of NCE.  First, as 
mentioned previously, it is not always the case that the equilibrium posited in a static 
model is, in fact, optimal.  In this example, the MSNE is not stable, particularly if 
mistakes are made.   
y=1            A         
            
                                               
y = 0.75   C         D     
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
           
 0           B         
    0       x = 0.25       x = 1 
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A second, and perhaps more important, criticism is the concept of path 
dependency.  If we look at a simple, normal form version of this game, we see that 
there are two pure strategy equilibria; one in which both sexes go to the Go-Go, and 
one in which both go to the Reflex.  The evolutionary game shows us that which 
equilibrium we end up at depends crucially on where decision-making starts, and 
whether mistakes are made.  Thus, the optimal decision is often a function of the path 
that is taken and the static solution is often not accurate when evolutionary path is not 
considered. 
 
The strength of incorporating evolutionary games into economic pedagogy is that, but 
utilizing a simple example, one can actually make stronger conclusions about human 
behavior than had the instructor utilized a static model.  In this simple example, we 
allow individuals to make mistakes and/or act irrationally, yet come to a conclusion 
that makes more sense to students: i) eventually, the men and the women meet at the 
“right” location and ii) where the “right” location is depends on the interactions, 
mistakes, cultures and values of the decision-makers. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 We have tried to illustrate how institutional economists can use game theory to 
integrate institutional pedagogy with neoclassical pedagogy at the principles of 
economics level of education.  In addition, although game theory is commonplace and 
generally accepted by mainstream economists, it can be used by institutional 
economists to demonstrate how these traditional means of analyses often lead to 
unrealistic outcomes – at least with regard to the institutional viewpoint – and, used by 
neoclassical economists to teach students critical thinking in addition to analytical 
thinking.   
 
 We began with a static analysis that is typical of those used in a principles course.  
From here, we introduced timing, relaxed rationality, and considered evolutionary and 
cultural perspectives in our game.  After considering these important aspects we found 
that the evolutionary solution to the game was much different than the static solution.  
We then discussed how and why it was different, highlighting assumptions specified in 
the static game, and illuminating the fact that outcomes often depend on the path that is 
taken and that the static outcome is often not optimal when all of the relevant pieces are 
considered.  As students begin to understand how assumptions shape outcomes they too 
begin to learn “critically”.  However, students are also learning the analytical skills that 
employers seek - those skills that differentiate an economist from many other 
disciplines.   
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 We believe that game theory can be used by institutional economists at the 
principles level because it does not have to be taught using advanced mathematics, if 
taught creatively can be relevant and interesting to students and can combine adjacently 
institutional and neoclassical paradigms and analytical and critical thinking.  Game 
theory is especially important to institutional pedagogy because evolution, history, and 
culture can be integrated into games.  Not only are these things integrated, but they can 
set the foundation of the game and often shape the game’s outcome(s).  Game theory 
can also be used by institutional economists who want to analytically demonstrate how 
and why static models, which assume rationality of all economic agents, typically used 
by neoclassical economists to teach economic principles are often unrealistic and lead 
to incorrect outcomes; evolutionary game theory can serve this specific purpose, among 
others.  
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